Use of Resale Price Maintenance by Integrated Manufacturers: A New Loophole for Abuse of Monopoly Power by unknown
USE OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE BY INTEGRATED
MANUFACTURERS: A NEW LOOPHOLE FOR ABUSE
OF MONOPOLY POWER*
ALTHOUGH price-fixing is illegal per se under the antitrust laws,1 Congress
has granted immunity from that prohibition to certain resale price main-
tenance contracts entered into by manufacturers of branded or trade marked
goods.2 Both the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts specifically state, how-
ever, that they do not legalize such agreements "between persons, firms, or
corporations in competition with each other."3 An agreement between a non-
integrated manufacturer and wholesalers or retailers to maintain a resale price
on the manufacturer's product is between parties who are not competing on
the same functional level of enterprise. The contracts are therefore "vertical"
and clearly within the scope of Fair Trade legislation. 4 But when a manu-
facturer who owns retail or wholesale outlets utilizes resale price mainte-
nance to bind competing retailers or wholesalers, the practice can be con-
*United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
1. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) ; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Soils, 220
U.S. 373 (1911).
2. Such contracts are lawful if state law authorizes them as to intrastate transactions
and if the product affected is in "free and open competition with commodities of the same
general class produced or distributed by others." 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1952) (Miller-Tydings Act) ; 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952) (McGuire Act). At
present, 45 states have Fair Trade lavs. For texts of the state statutes, see 2 CCH TRADI,
REG. REP. 111 0,000-15,520.10 (1954).
For discussions of Fair Trade in general consult FTC RE'oRT ON RESALE PRIcE
MAINTENANCE (1945) (hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT); GRETIIER, PRIcE CoNTIOL
UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION (1939); Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Cu.
L. REv. 175 (1954).
3. "Nothing contained in paragraph (2) of this subsection shall make lawful contracts
or agreements providing for the establishment or maintenance of minimum or stipulated
resale prices on any commodity referred to in paragraph (2) of this subsection, between
manufacturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or
between factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in com-
petition with each other." 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952) (§ 5(a) (5) of the Me-
Guire Act). The second proviso of § 1 of Miller-Tydings is almost identical. 50 STAT,
693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
4. See 98 CONG. REc. 4951 (1952). See also Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Co., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951) (dictum) ; Lionel Co. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, 27 N.J.
Super. 54, 60, 98 A.2d 623, 626 (1953) (same).
5. In response to the limitation on Fair Trade imposed by the Supreme Court in
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), the McGuire Act
broadened the immunity of resale price maintenance contracts from the antitrust laws by
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sidered "horizontal" in nature and outside the exemption from the antitrust
laws provided by Miller-Tydings and McGuire. 6
Nevertheless, in the recent case of United States v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc.,7 a district court held that a showing that defendant qua wholesaler
competed with independent wholesalers in the distribution of commodities
manufactured by defendants did not automatically prevent McKesson from
entering into resale price contracts with such wholesalers." Since the agree-
ments were capable of operative effect in both a "horizontal" and a "vertical"
direction, the court was unwilling to find either label more apposite than the
other or to pin its decision on factors having little more than semantic
validating rights of action created by state nonsigner laws. Such nonsigner laws ordinarily
provide that "willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any com-
modity at less than the price or prices prescribed in such contracts or agreements whether the
person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party to such a contract
or agreement" is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby. (Emphasis added.)
See 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 10,000-15,520.10 (1954). Forty states now have such
nonsigner provisions. 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. If 3003 (1954). Contracting parties and
those bound to resale price agreements by state nonsigner provisions are treated without
distinction for purposes of the discussion that follows.
6. The problem has been considered by the courts, Federal Trade Commission, and
legal writers with varying results. Eastman Kodak Co., 3 CCH TRADE RmR. REP.
11,527 (FTC 1953) (contract invalid if hearing examiner finds actual competition between
the integrated manufacturer's outlets and the bound outlets) ; Doubleday & Co., 3 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. f 11,515 (FTC 1953) (contracts invalid if hearing examiner finds that
defendant contracted in his capacity as distributor) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Aljan Camera
Co., 133 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct 1954) (contract enforceable).
For discussions which reach different conclusions from those arrived at here, see
Weston, Resale Price Maintenance and Market Integration: Fair Trade or Foul Play?,
22 GEo. ,VAsH. L. REv. 658 (1954); 54 CoL L. Rv. 2S2 (1954); Note, Fair Trade
and Horicontal Price Fixing: Their Status Since the Second Schwegynasn Case, 63 YAt=
L.J. 538, 544-46 (1954).
7. 122 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
S. At its Bridgeport plant 'McKesson manufactures and packages over 400 different
items consisting of drugs, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and toilet preparations. In 19278 the
corporation began acquiring control of wholesale drug companies and has continued to
acquire them. Defendant now conducts a nationwide wholesale drug business, operating
74 wholesale drug divisions located in 35 states. Its wholesale business now accounts for about
65% of its total sales volume. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp.
333, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Weston, supra note 6, at 669 n.37.
Defendant's answer admitted that its manufacturing division sells price-fixed products
to independent wholesalers in 7 localities where the "trading areas" of McKesson's whole-
sale divisions "overlap" the "trading areas" of independents. Such sales amounted to
$283,462 in fiscal year 1951-1952. In addition, McKesson price-fixed products are sold
directly by defendant's manufacturing divisions to retailers in territories also served by
independent wholesalers. Furthermore, McKesson's wholesale divisions are permitted
to sell directly to competing wholesalers. Sales of this latter category amount to approxi-
mately $200,000 annually. United States - McKesson & Robbins, Inc., supra at .335.
9. The Government's motion for a summary judgment and its request for an injunc-
tion restraining price stipulation affecting competing wholesalers were denied.
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
significance. 10 Instead, it held that a factual showing of some additional in-
jurious effect upon competition beyond that inherent in the use of resale
10. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 333, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
1954). The court's realistic analysis represents a notable advance over the literalism that
has plagued the Federal Trade Commission in dealing with the problem. In Doubleday
& Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11,515 (FTC 1953), a majority of the Commission
stated its test as follows: "When negotiating the fair trade agreements with retailers was
respondent acting in its capacity as manufacturer-publisher or in its capacity as retailer?
In other words, it is necessary to study the particular agreement, examine its form,
economic purpose, intent and effect and then decide whether it is ...veytical or hori-
zontal ...." Id. at p. 12,493. However, the Commission reversed itself and the Doble.
day test was overruled sub silentio in Eastman Kodak Co., 3 CCH TRADE RE(. Rr1,.
11,527 (F.T.C. 1953). In the latter case, it was held that Kodak's contracts would be
invalid if the examiner found competition bletween Kodak's retail outlets and independent
retailers in the same market area. Id. at p. 12,507. No reasons were advanced for the
reversal other than the implied one that the Commission now intends to apply the proviso
language of the statutes strictly. On remand of the Kodak case, the examiner found that
Kodak's 35 wholly owned and controlled retail outlets located in leading cities throughout
the United States did in fact compete with independent retailers in the sale of 163 types
of price-fixed amateur photographic products manufactured by Kodak. Eastman Kodak
Co., FTC Doc. No. 6040, Initial Decision of the Hearing Examiner, filed May 18, 1954,
at 2, 6. But the examiner then proceeded to disregard the rule under which the case was
remanded to him and readopted the Doubleday test.
The examiner's application of the Doubleday "capacity" test demonstrates its incon-
clusive nature and the ease with which it can be evaded by skilled operators. In support
of his conclusion that the contracts were entered into by Kodak as manufacturer, the ex-
aminer cited the fact that in 1951 "sales of respondent's fair traded products by its own
outlet stores represent[ed] only about 3% of the total sales of respondent's fair traded
products." Id. at 7. On appeal from the examiner's decision, the Government argued that
the total sales by Kodals retail outlets in 1952 represented more then 51o of respondent's
overall sales and amounted to $33,124,035, which probably made Kodak the largest single
retailer of photographic products in the United States. Brief for Petitioner Supporting
the Complaint, p. 25, Eastman Kodak Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REi'. 111,527 (FTC 1953).
Thus it is apparent that the significance of any revenue breakdown is slight. The figures
can be made to support either side of the argument by selecting different years and shifting
the context in which the figures are viewed.
Although no breakdown of Kodak's profits was in evidence, the examiner also argued
that there was "such a preponderance of respondent's business in the manufacturing field
that it is not reasonable to believe that its business or profits as a manufacturer have been
sacrificed in order to bolster its profits as a retailer." Eastman Kodak Co., FTC Doe.
No. 6040, Initial Decision of the Hearing Examiner, at 20. However, since Kodak may
have underestimated the elasticity of demand for its products, it may have raised retail
markups without any belief that it was thereby sacrificing sales volume on the manufactur-
ing level. The percentage of business on various levels of enterprise is hardly determina-
tive of the crucial issue involved in the use of resale price maintenance by integrated
manufacturers: whether the firm has the power and incentive to integrate inefficiently.
The other indicia of Kodak's intent to contract as manufacturer adduced by the ex-
aminer seem even less convincing. He noted that the contracts recited that Kodak signed
as manufacturer; that Kodak's retail outlets could "readily meet the lowest price any
competitor could offer," so that Kodak used price maintenance only to protect the
brand names of its manufacturered products; and that the contracts related only to
particular Kodak products "rather than to all articles of the same general class regard-
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price maintenance by nonintegrated manufacturers would be necessary to de-
prive an integrated manufacturer of the benefits of Fair Trade.11
McKesson's insistence upon a factual showing of an additional restraint
upon competition imposes an unjustifiable burden on the Government. Proof
of specific intent to injure or actual injurious effect is no longer necessary
to establish a violation of the antitrust laws, 12 although either will support
a finding that there has been such a violation. Contracts or agreements
which merely create the power to injure competitors or the public at will
are also illegal.' 3 Such power must be prohibited even though unexercised
or exercised without any presently discernable injurious effect. If private
parties are allowed to possess power to control the market, constant judicial
less of manufacturing source." Id. at 19-20. The form of the contracts assuredly should
not control. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911). And the
government's brief on appeal points out that the recital did not appear in Kodak's agree-
ments until after the FTC had investigated the matter. Brief for Petitioner Supporting
the Complaint, p. 21, Eastman Kodak Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f1 11,527 (FTC
1953). Secondly, there is no factual matter in the record to support the assertion that
Kodak's retailers would benefit competitively from the abandonment of price maintenance
on Kodak-manufactured goods. And see text at notes 12-18 infra. Finally, invalid
"horizontal" agreements need not concern more than one product of one manufacturer.
United States v. Masonite Co., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
11. The opinion is not without ambiguity on this point. In one place the court
speaks of the necessity of a showing of "some injury, inchoate or consummate, to com-
petition." United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 333, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, it is apparent that the McKesson court was
calling for a factual showing of an actual injury or intent to injure. See id. at 338 (factual
showing of illegality necessary) ; id. at 339 (factual showing that manufacturer became a
wholesaler with intent to gouge consumers an example of illegality) ; ibid. (bare assertion
that the mere existence of price-fixing induces competing wholesalers to buy from McKes-
son rather than from other manufacturers not a prima fade factual showing of illegality
absent some factual showing that such is the case).
12. "[E]ven if we assume that a specific intent to accomplish [the prohibited] result
is absent, [defendant] is chargeable in legal contemplation with that purpose since the end
result is the necessary and direct consequence of what he did." United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 103 (1948). Accord, United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913) ;
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173 (1948) ; United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942).
"The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to
control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices .... Agreements which
create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful
restraints .... That such was the view of this Court in deciding the Standard Oil and
Tobacco cases, and that such is the effect of its decisions both before and after those
cases, does not seem fairly open to question." United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1926). See also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265,
281-82 (1942); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225 n.59 (1940).
Cf. American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810-11 (1946); United States Y.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-09 (1948); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 173 (1948).
13. See, generally, Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrmlmnt of Pro-
gress, 14 U. Cns. L RRv. 567 (1947).
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supervision of the reasonableness of their actions would be necessary. 14 And
this would inevitably lead to administrative control of the industry by a public
agency.' ; Moreover, it would be impossible to determine the reasonableness
of the decisions made by those in command of the market even if such
regulation by the Government could be avoided.' 0 The fundamental premise
of our national policy is that competition rather than courts, administrative
agencies, cartels, or monopolists should be relied on to direct the operation
and development of our economy.17 Therefore, the only meaningful standard
for economic conduct is that it stand the test of competition in a free market.18
The principle that marketing devices which are not illegal in themselves
become illegal when they create the power to override the market has been
applied to those areas of our economy in which Congress has allowed mo-
nopoly power to exist.' 9 The courts have refused to permit holders of legal
monopoly power to utilize contractual arrangements which would enable
them to exploit or extend their power beyond the specific exemption from
the general rule of competition.20 Thus, in United States v. Grifflth,2' the
defendant was enjoined from purchasing motion pictures on a circuit-wide
basis because of the defendant's monopoly position in some of the towns in
which it owned theatres. No proof was required that independent exhibitors
had actually been injured by Griffith's use of a single contract for its entire
circuit.22 The Supreme Court condemned the practice because it created
14. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (dictum);
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 536 (1944) (same).
15. Rostow, supra note 13, at 573. Cf. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc.
v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1941) ; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211, 242 (1899).
16. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927) (dictum);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1942) (same). Cf. the opinion
of Judge Taft in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 283-84 (6th
Cir. 1898).
17. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951) (dictum); United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 187 (1944) (same) ; Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911.) (same). See also Rostow & Sachs, Entiry Into
the Oil Refining Business: Vertical Integration Re-Examined, 61 YALE L.J. 856, 864
(1952).
18. For recent justifications of the longstanding public policy favoring competitive
markets as the regulators of our economy and for refutations of its divergent modern
critics, see Loevinger, Antitrust and the New Economics, 37 MINx. L, Rzv. 505 (1953);
Bowman, Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 577 (1953).
19. See, generally, Schueller, The New Antitrust Illegality Per Se: Forestallig and
Patent Misuse, 50 COL. L. ZEv. 170 (1950); Comment, Vertical Forestallilg Under the
Antitrust Laws, 19 U. CE!. L. Ray. 583 (1952).
20. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S 287, 300 (1948); United States v,
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309
U.S. 436, 456-57 (1940).
21. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
22. "What effect these practices actually had on competitors of appellee exhibitors
or on the growth of the Griffith circuit we do not know." United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100, 109 (1948).
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the power to obtain advantages for the corporation's theatres in the non-
monopoly towns which were unrelated to the competitive efficiency of those
theaters 23 Attempts to tie a nonpatented commodity to the sale of a patented
one have been dealt with in a similar fashion.2 4 No proof of actual injury
to firms producing goods which compete with the unpatented, tied-in com-
modity has been required because such tie-in contracts create the power to
inflict such injury.2 5
The use of resale price maintenance by an integrated manufacturer gen-
erates a power to injure competitors and consumers beyond the scope of
the restriction on competition expressly sanctioned by Congress. The non-
integrated manufacturer's resale price is normally geared to the marketing
costs of the independent resale outlet of average efficiency.20 This assures
the manufacturer optimum distribution at the optimum price. 7-  However,
when an integrated producer sets resale prices, the selling costs of the manu-
facturer's own outlets may become an important additional element of price
determination.28 If his outlets are inefficient, the cost of this inefficiency may
be reflected in a higher resale price fixed for his commodity because resale
price maintenance gives him the power to insulate his outlets from the in-
roads of more efficient competitors. The manufacturer can effectively pre-
vent price cutting on his own product by virtue of the new power against
nonsigners granted by the McGuire Act.29  Furthermore, the integrated
manufacturer can count on similar upward price revisions by producers of
like commodities. For the core of the matter is that manufacturers ordinarily
use resale price maintenance only in those industries in which there is a
high degree of price parallelism.30 In industries in which the price structure
23. "The consequence of such a use of monopoly power is that films are licensed on a
non-competitive basis in what would otherwise be competitive situations." Id. at 103.
24. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) ; Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
25. In International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), appellant's leases
of its patented machines contained a provision requiring lessees to use only appellant's salt
products therein. Appellant contended that summary judgment was unauthorized because
it precluded trial of alleged issues of fact as to whether the restraint was unreasonable
within § 1 of the Sherman Act or substantially lessened competition or tended to create a
monopoly in salt within § 3 of the Clayton Act. But the Court said: "We think the ad-
mitted facts left no genuine issue .... " Id. at 396.
26. See FTC REroaR 127, 129; Fulda, Resale Price Maine csWe, 21 U. Cr. L RE%.
175, 189, 191 (1954).
27. 54 CoT L. REv. 282, 285 (1954).
28. Cf. United States v. Piramount.Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 147-48 (1943).
29. See note 5 supra. Recent Congressional validation of state nonsigner provisions
as applied to sales in interstate commerce may account for the newly developed attack on
the use of price maintenance by integrated manufacturers.
30. Resale price maintenance was designed in part to protect investment in the good
will symbolized by brand names against the depreciation which might result from loss-
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is not "sticky," a resale price agreement is merely an unwelcome device which
hinders distributors in meeting constantly fluctuating price levels and con-
sequently results in a loss of sales and profits.
The scope of the potential injury is wider than an increase in retail prices
to consumers. The availability of resale price maintenance is a powerful in-
centive to forward integration as well as a technique for protecting inefficient
outlets already in operation.31 In turn, the manufacturer's construction or
purchase of additional outlets eliminates, pro tanto, both existing and potential
independent competing distributors.3 2 Finally, the producer's newly acquired
outlets will enhance his market position on the manufacturing level by reason
of his growing command of the channels of distribution. 3 McKesson's
requirement of an evidentiary showing of these effects would ordinarily be
incapable of fulfillment. 34 The court should have recognized the principle
that the power to bring about a prohibited effect is sufficient to invalidate a
marketing device and it should have held that the power of manufacturer-
distributors to utilize resale price maintenance as an umbrella over inefficient
leader selling. Investment in brand name development is most prevalent where a few
manufacturers control significant fractions of the market and produce commodities which
are close but not perfect substitutes. Where such a "differentiated oligopoly" exists,
independent price determination tends to be discouraged. BAIN, PRucF THEORY 276
(1952). Price competition will then be susperseded by nonprice rivalry, a less expensive
method of dividing the market. Id. at 311. See also Comment, 19 U. Cm. L. PR.v. 583,
598 (1952) ; FTC REPORT lvi, lxi, lxii.
Furthermore, price leadership has proved virtually uncontrollable under the Fair
Trade laws. The Act's condemnation of "horizontal" agreement has been repeatedly cir-
cumvented. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 5767 (McGuire Act), 82d Cong., 2d sess. 259 (1952); Hear-
ings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on
Resale Price Maintenance, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 97-99 (1952) ; FTC REPORT, lx-lxii, 545.
The only other statutory weapon available against collusion is the requirement that price-
fixed commodities be in "free and open competition with commodities of the same general
class produced or distributed by others." See statutes cited note 2 supra. It has rarely
been successfully invoked. Fulda, supra note 26, at 197-98; 1 CCH TRADE Rno. RE'.
3154 (1954).
31. Certainly operating outlets producing assured revenue of, say, 15% constitute
more attractive investments for surplus corporate capital than securities which may yield
a maximum average of 8%. The present drive among corporations for diversification
is evidence of the existence of surplus corporate capital and the general recognition of
the profitability of investment in going businesses rather than in securities. See U.S. News
& World Report, Aug. 13,1954, pp. 68, 71.
32. Yet an important purpose of Fair Trade is the protection of small, individual
entrepreneurs from the incursions of larger, wealthier distributors. See note 41 infra.
33. Cf. DIRIA." & KAHN, FAIR COmPmEiTION: THE LAW AND EcoNomics OF ANTI-
TRUST POLICY 142 (1954).
34. See the discussions of evidentiary problems involved in antitrust litigation in
Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE LJ. 1019,
1242 (1949) ; McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation,
64 HIv. L REv. 27 (1950).
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forward integration is sufficient to warrant condemnation of the use of the
device by such firms.3 5
This analysis, however, does not justify the application of a per se rule
in this area.36 An integrated firm will derive no illicit power from its use
of resale price maintenance if the firm is in an industry in which pricing
practices on the manufacturing level are highly competitive. In such an in-
dustry there is no price leverage which the integrated firm can use to e-xpand
inefficiently, because a rise in price will result in reduced profits due to a loss of
35. Cf. DnuA & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 142-43: "The only condition
necessary for integration to raise the possibility of abuse is the existence of substantial
imperfections of competition in some of the fields in which an integrated company operates.
The very fact that a company sells in a number of markets, or fulfills a number of func-
tions, in some of which it is subjected to weaker competitive pressures than in others, gives
it a leverage and a staying power in its more highly competitive operations that have
nothing to do with its relative efficiency there . . . [I]ntegration that links together
competitive areas with others in which competition is already seriously defective accom-
plishes by financial consolidation something very much like what is accomplished by the
tie-in prohibited by Section 3 of the Clayton Act: it permits the use of market power in
one area to create competitive advantages unrelated to efficiency in others."
36. But a majority of the FTC has already adopted such a rule, contingent only on
a finding of "actual" competition between the integrated manufacturer's outlets and the
outlets bound by the Fair Trade agreement Eastman Kodak Co., 3 CCH TnAuz Rmo.
REP. 1[ 11,527 (FTC 1953).
And the Supreme Court may have embraced the per se rule in United States v.
Mlasonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). There, defendant Masonite, a manufacturer of a
patented hardboard used in the building trade, executed del credcre "agency agreements"
for the sale of his product, reserving the right to fix the resale price. Defendant "agents"
were engaged either in manufacturing and selling building materials, or in selling
building materials manufactured by others. Both "principal" and "agent" maintained
selling organizations and to a large extent competed in the same markets. Holding the
arrangement to be an illegal price-fixing conspiracy the Court said: "[W]hen it is clear
... that the marketing systems utilized by means of the del credere agency agreements
are those of competitors of the patentee and that the purpose is to fm' prices at which
the competitors may market the product, the device is without more . . . a violation of
the Sherman Act." Id. at 279. The Supreme Court found no authorization of such a
scheme in the Miller-Tydings Act Id. at 279 nA.
The McKesson court distinguished Masonite. It said the latter case did not involve
Fair Trade agreements, "but rather a familiar attempt by a patentee, through agency
and licensing arrangements, to extend a patent monopoly beyond the limits of the patent
and anti-trust statutes." United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 333,
339 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). But the patent question wras raised only as a matter of defense to
the government's underlying charge of illegal price-fixing. United States . Masonite,
supra at 276. And the Supreme Court disposed of the contention by noting that a
patentee had no more right to construct illegal combinations between competitors than
the owner of an unpatented commodity. Id. at 279. The McKesson court also argued
that "even considered as fair trade agreements a sufficient factual showing of illegality
existed because several competing manufacturers, unrelated as buyers and sellers, agreed
upon prices at which the product of one such manufacturer should be sold in competition
with that of the others." United States v. McKesson & Robbins, supra at 339. The
Supreme Court, however, said that the presence of competing patents served merely to
accentuate the evil condemned, zvi., the regimentation of competing marketing systems by
Masonite through price-fixing. United States v. Masonite Corp., supra at 279, 281.
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its customers to other manufacturers.8 Since Fair Trade is ordinarily found
only in industries in which there is no active price competition between manu-
facturers,38 use of the device by a manufacturer-distributor should be prima
facie unlawful. But an integrated firm should be allowed to prove as an
affirmative defense that price competition within its industry is sufficiently
intense to prevent its use of Fair Trade to preserve or expand inefficient
outlets.3 9
The Supreme Court has emphasized that resale price maintenance is a
privilege, restrictive of a free economy, which should be limited to the pur-
poses for which it was clearly intended.40 Fair Trade was enacted to enable
manufacturers to protect their investment in brand name development from
the depreciation caused by loss-leader selling and to safeguard small inde-
pendents from the competitive advantages of large chain distributors.41 The
evidentiary requirements of McKesson will encourage manufacturers, under
the guise of brand name protection, to preempt the field of distribution from
37. Cf. DIRLAmI & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 146-47: "[T]he root cause of
inequity and possible monopoly power issuing from integration is the imperfection of
competition in the less workably competitive field that the integrated firm operates in,
rather than the integration that ties this operation to others. It is the absence of competi-
tion in the supply of telephone service that confers on Western Electric the power to
exploit telephone subscribers and to carry on unfair competition in unsheltered markets.
With pure competition in the telephone business, there would be no cause for concern about
vertical integration."
38. See note 30 supra, and accompanying text.
39. Advocates of Fair Trade have pointed to certain items in which price competi-
tion is said to be brisk. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 5767 (McGuire Act), 82d Cong., 2d sess.
22-23 (1952) (e.g., electric toasters, face powder).
The term "price competition" is not used herein as the equivalent of the statutory
phrase "free and open competition," nor has the latter phrase been interpreted to include
the former. 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 3154 (1954) ; Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance,
21 U. Cm. L. Ray. 175, 197-98 (1954). Active price competition should be an additional
prerequisite to resale price-fixing by integrated firms.
40. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Co., 341 U.S. 384, 389-90, 395 (1951).
Cf. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942).
An interesting parallel can be drawn between the Schwegmann case, supra, and the
present problem in the matter of the construction of the language of the Fair Trade laws,
In Schweginann the question was whether the Miller-Tydings Act, which legalized price
maintenance "contracts or agreements" already lawful under state law, included within its
purview state nonsigner provisions. The Court held that it did not since the Act spoke
only in terms of consensual agreements, references to nonsigner provisions being meticu-
lously omitted. The last phrase of the proviso in the Federal Acts, disallowing contracts
or agreements "between persons, firms or corporations in competition with each other,"
has apparently never been included in any of the state statutes. As to the preceding part
of the clause, the state and federal laws are ordinarily identical. 2 CCH TRADE REo. REr.
111 0,000-15,520.10 (1954). Thus, applying the converse of the rule in Schweginann, it
would seem that meticulous inclusion of the phrase indicates that Congress intended a
more rigorous prohibition of "horizontal" agreements than that found in state statutes.
41. See United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 333, 338 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) ; 54 COL. L. Ray. 282, 284-85 (1954).
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efficient independents. And it will allow them to injure consumers to a
greater degree than that clearly authorized by Congress.&4 The proposed
doctrine of prima facie illegality would preserve the dual function of Fair
Trade and would more effectively protect the interests of consumers, inde-
pendent distributors, and independent manufacturers.
42. See text at notes 26-30 supra. Cf. 54 CoL L. Rsv. 282, 285 (1954).
